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ISSN 0342 - 0787I. A CAP with less trade interference?
First World politicians ascribe an exceptionally high social
value to the well-being of domestic farmers, apparently without
being penalized by political setbacks. In the European Community
(EC) , they fix domestic prices on most agricultural commodities
above world market prices, sustain these prices through variable
import levies and export restitutions, subsidize production and
factor use and dampen price fluctuations, all with the purpose of
raising the levels and improving the stability of farmers
1 in-
comes. While agricultural policymakers in the United States (US)
and in most other OECD countries do not always intervene in the
same commodity markets, they generally rely on the same set of
instruments . Given the fairly inelastic demand and supply re-
sponses among Second World planners and the limited flexibility
among Third World producers and consumers, the effect of agri-
cultural policies adopted in the First World is to lower the
levels of world agricultural prices and to amplify their oscil-
lations . World welfare' is reduced as a result. Although net food
importers in the Third World gain on account of the Terms of
Trade effect, the increased uncertainty arising from these poli-
cies, which also becomes transmitted to non-food commodity sup-
plies, turns the net welfare effect negative in most cases .
On the use of agricultural policy instruments in the EC, the US
and other OECD countries see, respectively, Harris, Swinbank
and Wilkinson (1983), Gorter (1983) and OECD (various issues).
See Sarris and Freebairn (1983) and Schmitz and Koester (1983).
See Koester and Bale (1984) for a review of the issues. For a
country study see Dick, Gerken and Vincent (1982), for a world
study see Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1985).- 2 -
The authorities in the First World could avoid domestic and for-
eign welfare losses by pursuing the income level and the income
stability targets with a different set of policies that include
direct income transfers and an insurance solution to income in-
stability .Agricultural policymakers have shown little willing-
ness to seriously debate alternatives proposed by the agricul-
tural economics profession on welfare grounds, rather they have
accomplished to win public support for the continuation of their
price and subsidy policies. What has been called the "dialogue of
the deaf" (Hagedorn 1984a) suggests that the two sides perceive
targets and constraints of agricultural policymaking differently.
Budget considerations, among others, seem to shape agricultural
policy decisions more than welfare considerations. For the EC's
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) budgetary problems became press-
ing when, commodity by commodity, the European farmers' supply
response to the CAP propelled the Community into a net export
position, thus drying out tariff revenues and escalating the
expenditure on export subsidies. In March 1984, the Council of
Agricultural Ministers (Council) which is the EC's sector policy-
2
making body, responded by extending production quotas from sugar
to milk, and by strengthening so-called guarantee thresholds to
some other commodities, particularly cereals and vine . These
See Koester and Tangermann (1977).
2
Above-quota supplies on the producer level, or on the first-
buyer level, are charged a levy sufficient to cover the full
cost of disposal.
In 1982, sugar accounted for 2.4% of final agricultural produc-
tion evaluated in intra-EC prices, milk accounted for 19.2%,
cereals (excluding rice) for 12.9% and vine for 5.8%. Commis-
sion of the European Community 1985.- 3 -
thresholds might signal future output restrictions as they did in
the case of milk prior to March 1984 . The production quota in-
strument seems to open the option of pursuing the income level
target by raising guarantee prices on stagnant or falling quotas.
In that case, the trend to an ever-increasing misallocation of
world production locations would be reversed.
Since the EC is a dominant participant on most temperate-zone
commodity markets the 1984 decision could conceivably have far-
reaching implications for Third World welfare. Lower production,
however, is by no means a certain outcome of adding production
quotas to the armory of sector politicians. The experience with
the EC's sugar quota and with milk quotas in Switzerland, Norway
and Austria is not encouraging in this respect. The Council could
finance both higher quotas and higher prices through a producer
levy - as it did in the case of sugar. It could continue in its
efforts to press the European Council, that is the policymaking
body of Prime Ministers and Heads of State, for higher contribu-
tions to the common budget. In this the quota instrument would
facilitate a more skillful exploitation of the ratchet effect
made possible by fluctuating world market prices (in Dollar) and
variations in the ECU/Dollar rate. That would entail an expansion
of quotas whenever high world market prices (in ECU) allow for
additional surplus disposal on the world market, then legitimiz-
A guarantee threshold defines an EC-wide level of supplies for
which the intervention price is supposed to be guaranteed.
Excess supply triggers corrective action of the Council for the
next year. The Council introduced production quotas on the farm
level or on the first-buyer level when a price cut of 12% was
estimated necessary to reduce milk production to the EC-wide
guarantee threshold.- 4 -
ing the new reference quantity and presenting the subsequent
downswing in ECU world market prices as an external shock, which
in all fairness should be borne by all, to be absorbed through an
extended and again legitimized budget. World agriculture could
therefore be thrown into even greater "disarray" (Johnson 1973).
This paper investigates the EC's policy choices after the 1984
Council decisions with the aim to predict the trend in agricultu-
ral trade interference. First, the objectives and the institu-
tional constraints of agricultural policymaking in the Community
must be brought to light. In section II this is attempted with a
positive (as opposed to normative) analysis. What choices will be
made obviously depends on the impact of various options on tar-
gets and constraints as perceived by the members of the Council,
that is the national ministers of agriculture. Sectino III des-
cribes the analytical approache taken in the evaluation of op-
tions. A brief description of the EC simulation model is provided
in the Appendix. In section IV the reference case is established:
a freeze in all 1982 intervention levels and a continuation of
exogenous trends. The alternative policies which can be used to
reverse the relative income trend predicted in the reference case
are simulated in section V. This leads to the selection of two
polar cases of a range of combined quota and price interventions
which are feasible in the sense of being acceptable to European
agricultural policymakers. The implications of these cases for
inflation, intra-European transfers and, particularly for Euro-
pean interference in world agricultural commodity markets are
discussed in section VI. Tentative conclusions on the future
course of the Common Agricultural Policy are drawn in section
VII.5 -
II. Objectives and constraints of European agricultural policy-
making
II.1 Organized discontent
When private plans are coordinated through markets, changes in
foreign and domestic factor endowments, in technology and in
tastes affect the sectoral and the regional structure of economic
activity. While the suppliers of labour and capital services,
though with some hesitation, respond to higher rewards elsewhere,
the owners of factors that are specific to a particular sector or
location see their earnings shrink relative to those of fellow
citizens when the sector or location declines. They then have an
incentive to ask for political instead of market coordination.
In the mid- and late 19th century industrialization gained momen-
tum on the European continent, scale effects of urban agglomera-
tion were exploited, new frontiers were opened overseas and ad-
vances in transport technology eroded the natural protection of
the agricultural sector. Farmers found themselves on the losing
end of both sectoral and regional structural changes. By 1870,
their discontent led them to form the first modern political
associations outside the system of political parties in France
and in Germany . More than a century later, farmers' associations
See Puhle 1975, Neville-Rolfe 1984. Instrumental for overcoming
the free rider problem of large groups with many small members
were fundamentalist ideologies which transformed collective
feelings of status-loss into strong feelings of solidarity.
Olson 1965, Hagedorn and Schmitt 1985.- 6 -
stand out as the most successful among the many groups in Western
Europe competing for political favours . Farmers
1 discontent with
market coordination seems easy to understand. It is less obvious
why the political demands of this particular minority should
prevail and why they should be specified and met in the way they
are.
II.2 Constraints of sector policy
Farmers cannot hope to advance their case by switching votes
between political parties. Besides being a small minority, they
are also known for their party loyalty. With a given redistri-
bution budget, therefore, political entrepreneurs could mobilize
more votes among groups that are both larger and show a more
2 flexible voting behaviour . Also, from the farmers' point of
view, party programmes would not be sufficiently differentiated
to make voting the main channel of influence. Farmers had to
entrust specialists with furthering their detailed demands
through parliament and administration - and had to accept their
leadership in return. The formulation and representation of farm
interests has consequently become the task of a political sector
elite consisting of specialized parliamentarians and politicians,
high level administrators and the executives of farmers' asso-
ciations .
See Tracy (1982) on the history of farmers' political response
in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark and in the
European Community.
See Beusmann and Hagedorn 1984.- 7 -
The evolution of professional leadership has two important impli-
cations for the range of admissible policy options. (1) The pro-
fessionals will not lose sight of their own interests and will,
therefore, hardly approve of policy proposals which are likely to
lower the demand for their services. (2) Leaders are permanently
involved in explaining policy demands to their clientele and are
therefore more trusted than members of the general public includ-
ing the agricultural economics profession. To some extent, then,
leaders can control the intra-sector conflicts (for example be-
tween small and large landowners, between cattleholders and wheat
growers, and between young and old farmers) which are brought
about by the unavoidable distributional implications of sector
policy. The control over intra-sector conflicts is in, fact a
prerequisite for the production of political influence.
Any sector policy is constrained by macroeconomic policy as well
as by other sector policies which are influenced by consumers,
taxpayers and numerous rival pressure groups through voting and
other channels. Farmers are at a comparative disadvantage with
respect to voting. The political sector elite has, therefore,
seized the opportunity provided by the Treaty of Rome's call for
common policies. Unlike their cabinet colleagues for Industry,
Transport, Labour, or Health, ministers of agriculture, with the
support of farmers' associations, have readily agreed to transfer
policy decisions from the national to the community level on
which there is little electoral control. But also with respect to
the remaining national agricultural policies have they succeeded
in what the Dutch call "verkokering", that is, self-contained- 8 -
insulation .
To obtain public consent for the insulation, the professionals
engage in ideological work. The electorate is assured that a
complex sector policy, the details of which are best left to the
experts, is only fair. Sector demands are presented as being in
accordance with prevailing conceptions of social justice. Von
Weizsacker (1983) lists four of them: the legitimacy of near
(modest) objectives, the justice of the status quo ante, the pro-
tection of the poor and the weak and a just reward for the sup-
pliers of public goods. Three are extensively used in. public
relations work: (1) Farmers are said to only demand income parity
- which appears modest enough as long as the implications of a
particular policy for the real value of assets held by farmers
are not spelled out. (2) A level of support once achieved is
always the normative base for future parity demands. This appeals
to a public which is not accustomed to fluctuations around the
income trend. Whoever merely wants to keep his piece of the pie,
does not take anything away from others. (3) The presentation of
needy farm families would be unsuitable for eliciting more sup-
port for the whole sector. It would more likely awaken the public
to the intra-sector distribution issue. Rather, the affluence of
large farmers must be justified. Farmers are said to produce
public goods like food supply security, food quality reliability,
Louwes (1984) uses the term to capture "... the tendency to
create insulated political circuits between pressure groups,
clientele ministers and civil servants as well as specialists
in parliament... Such circuits for the formulation and
implementation of agricultural policies, which are more or less
independent from the rest of the political system, have been
created in all member states and on the community level."_ 9 -
environmental protection and political stability, and to repre-
sent the vanguard in the process of European political inte-
gration. These claims relate to very basic fears in the electo-
rate. For the individual citizen who is not trained in the eco-
nomics of welfare and trade it appears reasonable to accept the
sector policy as part of an implicit social contract: farmers are
supported as a precaution against possible emergencies. His op-
posed preferences as a consumer or taxpayer are then neutralized
or even reversed. Once public consent to insulation has been
achieved, a farm-interest policy is almost costless to the pol-
itical party farmers traditionally vote for. This allows farmers'
representatives to pressure party politicians by threatening
abstention in general elections.
II.3 Objectives
The public consent to the insulation of agricultural policy has
been brought about at the expense of an ideology constraint:
sector policy targets must always be shown to be in line with the
prevailing conceptions of social justice. The proclaimed targets,
therefore, need not fully reflect the underlying objectives of
farmers' political activity.
Farmers' dissatisfaction with market coordination is brought
about by the unfavourable development of sector-specific factor
earnings. Policy demands , therefore, envisage a trend shift in
these earnings . Specificity, however, is a time-related concept.
It will be assumed here that the trend level of earnings is
independent from the variance.- 10 -
Labour is fixed to the sector only in the short-run, human capi-
tal and non-durable physical capital are sector-specific in the
medium-run, and land and durable physical capital in the long-
run. While payments to land and durable physical capital may fall
towards zero, payments to the services of other factors, because
of inter-sector movements, remain under the influence of factor
returns outside the sector. The income parity target of agricul-
tural policy, though nowhere precisely defined, basically relates
to the gap between the household incomes of farmers and of non-
agricultural workers. Asset returns contribute but a small share
to the household income of non-agricultural workers. Achievement
of the parity target, therefore, would not redress the dissatis-
faction of farmers which hold more than a trivial amount of land
and durable physical capital as real assets. Yet these farmers
belong to that section of the present farming population that
predictably remains in the sector while others outmigrate. It
matters here that professionals formulate policy. Their interest
in keeping up the demand for their services suggests that raising
the relative income position of those likely to remain in the
sector is the relevant objective. The criterion for selecting
between policy options then is their impact on rents accruing to
factors which are specific to the sector in the long-run. Policy
choices so far have been consistent:
- With respect to income parity, the first-best policy would be a
direct income transfer to persons presently engaged in the
sector. As less resources would be used up in misdirected pro-
duction, farmers would receive a higher share of the funds
provided by taxpayers and consumers. Provided new entries are- 11 -
not entitled to the transfer and recipients are allowed to
capitalize it when leaving the sector, the policy would speed
up the process of labour outmigration, thus solving the so-
called parity problem . Substituting direct income transfers to
persons presently engaged in the sector for price and subsidy
policies would cause capital losses for the holders of. real
agricultural assets. Direct transfers, could meet the dissatis-
faction of those remaining in the sector only when provided on
the basis of ownership of land and durable physical capital.
Direct income transfers have time and again been proposed by
members of the agricultural economics profession but have never
found support in the political process. The political sector
elite anticipates difficulties in explaining to the public,
year by year, that more direct transfers to compensate large
farmers, or absentee landowners, for unsatisfactory real asset
returns would be a just reward for the suppliers of public
goods, and would not violate the social justice notion of near
or modest objectives.
Sector politicians have assigned common price and production
subsidy policies to the income target. Immediately after a
price or subsidy increment, all returns as well as real asset
values improve. Over time, however, the rewards to mobile fac-
2
tors revert to the level of opportunity costs . The income of
persons not well-endowed with land and durable physical capital
again falls below -the parity line, whereas the relative income
position of households with substantial real assets is main-
See Koester and Tangermann (1977) for details.
2
See Schmitt and Tangermann (1984) .- 12 -
tained. Trying, and never quite succeeding, to combat the mi-
sery of land-poor farmers, the Community continues to step up
the level of prices and subsidies. Seemingly as a side effect,
rents to factors fixed in the long-run increase. The same me-
chanism is at work in the case of national subsidies on labour
and capital use, respectively called "social" and "structural"
policies. Aside from a higher factor input and production vo-
lume, their only lasting effect is, again, to increase rents.
Hagedorn (1984), among others, explains the professional lea-
ders' dislike of direct income transfers with the expected
strain on group solidarity within the sector. Their choice of
policies would then not disclose a discrepancy between the
parity target and the underlying objectives of sector policy.
Hagedorn contends that direct transfers would have to be allo-
cated according to general social policy rules, that is, with a
strong redistributive element. This would contradict the
intra-sector notion of justice and would, therefore, lead to
conflicts that could impair the ability of professional leaders
to exert influence. The argument implies that that sector poli-
ticians would feel constrained by the prospect of intra-sector
conflicts. Recent events in West Germany suggest otherwise.
Though production quotas strain intra-sector relations no less
than direct income transfers, the West German farmers' repre-
sentatives actively campaigned for the extension of quotas to
the milk sector prior to the decisions of the Council of Agri-
cultural Ministers in March 1984. This suggests that the pro-
fessionals relied on their proven ability to control intra-
sector conflicts.othek des Instituts
Veltwirtschaft Kiel
- 13 -
II.4 The choice in 1984
European agricultural policymakers have used their leeway for an
active price and subsidy policy. Eventually, however, CAP inter-
vention prices and subsidies approached a level where the con-
straints of general economic policy became binding again. Though
politicians are rarely inspired by aggregate welfare considera-
tions, they do worry about budget deficits, inflation, conflicts
within the Community and policy retaliations of third countries.
- Once the domestic supply reaction had carried the Community to
and above self-sufficiency in most temperate zone commodities,
further price advances proliferated the CAP deficit, and the
proportional gross national contribution to the common budget .
CAP expenditures in any one particular country relieve the
political pressure for national assistance which is why the so
called net transfer receives attention. Yet the growing na-
tional contribution must eventually trigger political protest
in all countries which do not hold a strong net agricultural
export position.
The CAP deficit - the net of expenditure on export restitu-
tions, intra-EC intervention buying and monetary compensatory
amounts (MCAs) and of revenue from import levies, producer
levies and MCAs - must be financed along with other common
expenditures by the common industrial tariff revenue and by
national contributions which are basically a flat percentage of
national value added (see Tables 4 and 5) . There is an under-
standing that the CAP' s "share in total expenditure should not
increase. Since industrial tariff rates are fixed at levels
agreed upon in GATT negotiations, the maximum CAP deficit de-
pends on the willingness of each member state to join in a flat
increase in the value added tax (VAT) contribution.- 14 -
- Relative world market prices for food have tended to decline
, over the last two decades . The inflationary effect of raising
European above world market prices, therefore, went largely un-
t? noticed by the public. Recognizing the substantial weight of
food in the consumer basket, macro politicians in inflation-
prone countries nevertheless do mind the lost opportunity for
retarding the climb of the consumer price index. They further
observe that the CAP adds to the Central Bank financed domestic
budget deficit.
- CAP effects on farmers' income differ from country to country.
Though the effects can be modified or compensated by national
decisions on sector-specific social and structural policy, the
Ministers of Agriculture have, in the interest of insulating
their fief against national control, tended to reconcile diver-
gent national interests within the Council's annual decision
package. Intra-community trade taxes and subsidies, so-called
monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs), were reintroduced as a
2
means for reconciliation . Yet the protest of farmers rightly
feeling discriminated by negative MCAs (import subsidies and
Hoffmeyer and Schrader (1985).
2
See Ritson and Tangermann 1979. Throughout, Germany and the
Netherlands have kept positive MCAs (import taxes and export
subsidies), France and Italy negative ones. This pattern is
consistent with the view that in low inflation/high income
countries governments tend to be less concerned with the CPI
effect of agricultural price policies, and more with their
income effect than in countries with relatively high inflation
rates and a somewhat lower level of per capita income.- 15 -
export taxes) curbed the use of the instrument. Divisive con-
flic s within the Council about the intra-EC transfer effects
of price and subsidy decisions have subsequently strained the
spirit of European integration.
- The trade effects of European agricultural policies have drawn
the rage of suppliers elsewhere in the world. The US government
has taken up the cause of domestic producers and has confronted
the EC with the prospect of a serious disruption in trade rela-
• ' j
tions which would not be confined to agricultural commodities.
There is no way to predict at which point any of the adverse
effects of the CAP will convince general politicians that they
should intervene. During a recession, for example, such a step
might be postponed as the release of farm labour, the slow-down
in agricultural investment and the worsening of the agricultural
trade balance would be unwelcome in that phase. The crisis in
Europe came in 1983, when the common budget was exhausted and the
French Minister of Agriculture insisted on the unconditional
dismantling of MCAs. Since the common price level could not be
raised within the existing budget, this would have resulted in a
major income shock to Dutch and German farmers which were at the
time enjoying high positive MCAs. The European Council would not
agree on a higher value added tax (VAT) contribution without a
CAP reform. For that case, the Prime Ministers and Heads of State
indicated, they would readily expand the budget by more than was
required for financing the accession of Spain and Portugal to the
Common Market.- 16 -
The Council of Agricultural Ministers then had the option to
- introduce direct income transfers,
- extend production quotas to all commodities in which the
Community was self-sufficient or about to become so in the
foreseeable future,
- finance higher intervention prices and subsidies through CAP
operations - by raising producer levies and introducing tariffs
and taxes on substitutes for EC-produced agricultural commo-
dities,
- stage a half-hearted "reform", elicit the higher VAT contribu-
tion and continue with the old strategy afterwards.
In the event the Council agreed on a package containing produc-
tion quotas for milk, guarantee thresholds for cereals, vine and
a few minor commodities, a more rapid phase out of MCAs than had
been envisaged before, a freeze in ECU intervention prices and in
various production subsidies, and a further "strengthening of the
Community preference", particularly a mandate for the EC-Commis-
sion to negotiate higher tariffs for substitutes within the GATT.
No element of direct transfers was included in the package. The
European Council subsequently agreed to contribute up to 1.6% of
the value added tax base from 1986 onwards without exactly speci-
fying the contribution after the accession of Spain and Portugal.- 17 -
The decisions are consistent with the proposition that direct
income transfers would not further the objectives of agricultural
policymakers in Europe. Besides that, all options for the future
have been left open. The Council can adopt a restrictive quota
and active price policy. It can, however, also expand quotas and
raise prices in a way that would leave little distinction to a
continuation of the previous price-cum-subsidy strategy. Even
without the prospect of a generous budget expansion it could
finance such a strategy through CAP operations. Whether it will
do so depends on which policy serves the national income targets
best while meeting the constraints of general economic policy in
member countries.
III. The approach to an analysis of options
III.l The steps of the quantitative investigation
The next step in the investigation is to work out the implica-
tions of policy options for relevant indicators of sector policy
and general economic policy. The analytical instrument best
suited for that purpose is a quantitative general equilibrium
model. An EC-model was constructed which recognizes four regions
and six commodities. A brief presentation is given in the Appen-
dix. In this section, the disaggregation is described along with
other salient features necessary for understanding the policy
simulations.- 18 -
The analysis of policy effects is organized in the following way.
First, a reference case is established. The general economic
policy constraint had become binding to the CAP in 1983, when the
budget was exhausted and the divergent interests of member coun-
tries could no longer be reconciliated through the agrimonetary
system. In the preceding year, the level of interventions had
stayed within the general policy constraint. The effects of
freezing that level, and abstaining from any additional policy,
therefore, provide a baseline for the evaluation of the effects
of policy alternatives. By how much would farmers' relative in-
come and agricultural employment decline when exogenous trends in
population, world income and total factor productivity continue
and the CAP is frozen at the 1982 level? In section IV the model
is used to simulate the medium-term development. In section V the
various options recognized by the Council are simulated in a
series of model experiments along with the exogenous trends. The
implications laid open for relative income differences between
member countries, for agricultural employment, for the budget and
for the intervention levels provide a basis on which to form a
judgement on whether an option is feasible in the sense of being
acceptable to sector politicians in member countries. Those op-
tions identified as acceptable within the sector are then in-
vestigated in section VI for their general policy implications,
particularly with respect to the implied net exports of agricul-
tural commodities to the rest of the world. This serves to
further narrow a down in the range of feasible options, and to- 19 -
describe the areas of future conflict between the Community and
other countries.
III.2 Salient features of the EC model
The EC model consists of two-sector general equilibrium models
for four regions of the EC-10. The agricultural sector produces
five commodities, the industrial sector one. Both sectors compete
for factor services. The regions are linked to each other and the
rest of the world through trade flows. The regional authorities
take common decisions on the prices or quantities of the agri-
cultural commodities, and they maintain a common agricultural
policy budget which leads to financial transfers between them.
The CAP fixes agricultural commodity prices in terms of the given
world price of the.industrial commodity. For the industrial commo-
dity, the model determines regional production, price, absorption
and international trade. For the agricultural commodities, the
system determines domestic production or production quota rents,
tariff and export subsidy rates, domestic absorption, interna-
tional trade and intra-EC transfers. Regional factor allocation
and factor returns are also determined. The theory of the model
has firm roots in microeconomic theory: producers and consumers
take prices as given, producers minimize costs subject to pro-
duction functions, consumers maximize utility subject to budget
constraints, and markets clear. The solution then represents an
equilibrium, that is, an allocation of commodities and production
factors which is supported by prices.- 20 -
Models have been constructed for West Germany, France, Italy and
the Rest of EC-10. The model for the Rest has only been included
to facilitate the modeling of a common budget. The three
country-specific models, among themselves, capture major intra-EC
differences with respect to the agricultural trade balance and to
the commodity composition of agricultural production which deter-
mines the distribution of CAP effects.
Agricultural commodities produced within the EC are treated as
perfect substitutes. Regional prices, therefore, differ only by
the ad valorem rates of intra-EC trade taxes and subsidies, the
so-called monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs). Regional indus-
trial goods and imports, however, are treated as imperfect sub-
stitutes conforming to the Armington formulation. The same ap-
plies to agricultural goods produced within the EC and to agri-
cultural imports from the rest of the world.
The agricultural produce is disaggregated into five groups of
commodities defined by SITC categories. The model groups and



















The production of these commodities is, in each region, con-
strained by one separable multi-output, production function. The
output shares in equilibrium are assumed £0 reflect the given and
fixed natural endowment of each region as well as relative commo-
dity prices. Changes in the output mix are brought about by
changes in relative prices or production subsidies, not by chan-
ges in relative input prices. The SITC code identifies food com-
modities after processing. Sector policy, however, is directed
towards the earnings of factors engaged in the primary stage of
production only. The model recognizes this distinction through a
nested input function, - where the nests' contain, respectively,
intermediates, primary factors for agricultural production and
primary factors for processing.
The model ignores international factor movements. Regional sup-
plies of primary factors are exogenously determined. Agriculture
and industry in each region compete for labour and non-durable
fixed capital (henceforth called capital). Land and durable phy-
sical capital are aggregated to a sector-specific factor (hence-
forth called land) that is in constant supply. Since the model is
only used for medium-term projections, no allowance has been made
for rigid factor service prices and for changes in the rates of
factor utilization. Region-wide, wages and returns to capital
equalize.- 22 -
Household income of farmers differs from those of the rest of the
population with respect to the shares contributed by rents accru-
ing to land and to production quotas. Ownership rights of pro-
duction quotas and land are linked in the model. Changes in far-
mers ' relative income are then due to the disproportionate devel-
opment of rental income and of aggregate factor income, that is,
of relative rental income. Relative rental income is used as the
target indicator of sector policy.
IV. The development of farmers' relative income under a constant
level of CAP interventions
In the first model experiment a five-year continuation of recent
low growth trends in world income, industrial total factor pro-
ductivity and population is assumed along with a further high
growth trend in agricultural total factor productivity. A change
in world demand patterns is not envisaged nor is the growth of
the capital stock in EC countries assumed to regain momentum. All
ad valorem rates of tariffs and subsidies are kept constant.
Sufficient time is assumed to elapse for all adjustments to take
place, in particular for labour and non-durable capital movements
to equalize rates of return across sectors.
Table 1 reports the percentage changes of agricultural employ-
ment, real rental income, real aggregate factor income and rela-
tive rental income which, according to the simulation, result
over a period of five years from the given percentage changes in- 23 -
world income, in the total factor productivity of agriculture and
industry of each country, and in the country population. Since
the model has a linear structure the total change in any
particular endogenous variable is simply the sum of the separate
changes of that variable which are brought about by changes in
each of the exogenous variables.
The separate simulation results for each c^ the exogenous trends
seem plausible - (a) world income growth raises demand for Euro-
pean industrial and agricultural goods and thus real returns to
land and all other primary factors; in the more industrialized
countries relatively more labour is attracted by the industrial
sector which reduces agricultural employment; (b) the monopo-
listic position of the EC in temperate-zone commodity markets
implies that agricultural productivity growth leads to sharp
reductions in world prices; at constant levels of protection
agricultural factor demand is subsequently reduced whereas the
real gain of productivity growth is captured by all suppliers of
mobile factor services; (c) productivity advances in the in-
dustrial sector likewise create real gains for all; with in-
dustrial export demand inelastic, industrial factor demand de-
clines thereby raising supply to the agricultural sector; (d) EC
wide population growth raises agricultural product and factor
demand and region-specific population growth makes more labour
available thereby raising the land rent. Population decline in
West Germany markedly reduces agricultural employment and land
rent since other farmers in the Common Market are quick to cap-
ture any market share at the going price level.Table 1 - Model projections of the medium-run impact of exogenous trends on selected sector variables in West Germany,










































































































































































.52 Ul- 24 -
The relative size of the effects of ongoing exogenous trends is
the important information given in Table 1. In all countries
rapid agricultural productivity growth dominates all other sour-
ces of change. At a constant level of protection farmers can
expect to stay on the losing end of structural change. Relative
rental income declines by 25 % in West Germany and the Rest-EC
and by 17-18 % in Italy and France, agricultural employment
shrinks between 13 % in France and Italy and 18-19 % in the Rest-
EC and West Germany. This suggests that farmers in all, and par-
ticularly in the more industrialized , countries of the EC will
in the future demand more political intervention, regardless of
the high level of support already achieved.
Within the Rest-EC the Benelux countries, the United Kingdom
and Denmark dominate the two less industrialized countries
Greece and Ireland.- 25 -
V. Alternative agricultural income policies
V.I Introduction
European farmers' relative income would fall dramatically were
the CAP frozen at the intervention level reached in 1982. The
options for a policy set on reversing this trend are simulated in
a series of experiments, and results are reported in Table 2. The
exogenous trends specified earlier are always maintained which
facilitates a comparison of each option's implications with those
of the reference case. The simulation results thus indicate
whether a policy can at all prevent the decline in relative in-
come, or what intervention level would be required. A policy
enhancing relative income may, or may not, step up the pressure
on labour to leave the sector. The results on agricultural em-
ployment thus provide an indication of potential intra-sector
conflict between small and large farmers which is connected with
the particular option. But for the budget limit, no general po-
licy constraints are recognized in the various experiments. The
policies simulated may, therefore, be infeasible because of their
implications for inflation, for transfers between member coun-
tries, and for their interference with world agricultural trade.
Such implications are worked out in section VI for a limited
range of policies for which the simulations in section V suggest
that they would meet constraints lying within the domain of Euro-
pean agricultural policy.Table 2 - Medium-run model projections of sectoral target indicators in West Germany, France, Italy





























































































1 In percentage changes unless indicated otherwise. - Policy simulations are described in the
Appendix, section A3. - Denotes variable exogenously set to zero. - ^ Absolute change in the
































































The target indicator is formulated on the national level. Since
an indicator for a group of countries is of little interest, the
simulation results for the Rest-EC, though reported in Table 2,
are not discussed any further.
V.2 Continuing old policies with higher VAT contributions
European agricultural policymakers might be tempted to return to
their old ways once the European Council has granted higher VAT
contributions. Whether pursuing the income target with higher
intervention levels is a feasible option, obviously, depends on
whether the consequent raise in the CAP deficit stays within the
new limits on the VAT contribution.
In experiment 2 the CAP deficit is allowed to increase so as to
finance a higher level of interventions. The expenditure on EC
interventions is structured by the five commodity groups and by
three types of intervention (export restitutions, import levies
and producers subsidies net of producer levies), which makes for
fifteen expenditure classes. Whereas the intervention level in-
creases, the expenditure structure is held constant, that is,
expenditures of all classes increase in the same proportion.
National intervention levels and MCAs are left unchanged. The
policy target of maintaining the relative income position is
imposed by exogenously setting the change in relative rental
income to zero. The model then solves for the change in the EC
intervention level, and it spells out the implication for the CAP
deficit. Since there is a target variable for each of the model's- 27 -
four regions, a decision has to be made which country's target is
imposed. Since German relative rental income falls most in the
reference case, the change in that variable is set to zero in
experiment 2.
The figures in Table 2 indicate that the VAT contribution would
have to be stepped up to about 1.2 % which is Tell within the new
limit set by the European Council. The relative income trend in
France would then be turned around and agricultural employment
would increase. The figures for Italy suggest that a continuation
of previous policies would completely miss the national target.
This reflects the dominant share of group 5 commodities in Ita-
lian agricultural production. The aggregate protection level for
this group is low because several important commodities within
the group are bound by GATT agreements on import tariffs. Since
export subsidies would be of little help to farmers when import
protection is not increased accordingly, EC assistance concen-
trates on producer subsidies (see Table 4 and Table 5 on the
Common Budget in the base year). The income impact coefficient of
one ECU in the budget, however, is higher when it is spent on
exports - by raising the domestic price it forces the domestic
consumer to support the producer by a multiple of what is allo-
cated to it in the budget. A proportional increase in expenditure
on all interventions and commodities, therefore, puts the reci-
pients of producer subsidies at a disadvantage. Raising the
intervention level without changing the expenditure structure on
interventions, thus, would aggravate regional imbalances within
the EC, which suggests that the option is not a feasible one.- 27a -
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In a further experiment, the Italian income target was imposed
along with the West German one and expenditure on group 5 pro-
ducer subsidies was allowed to rise overproportionally. The re-
sults are not reported in Table 2. Although the other expenditure
items grew less than in experiment 2, the CAP deficit resulting
from producer subsidies could not be financed within the 1.6 %
VAT contribution limit. Hence, a return to pre-1984 policies does
not seem to be a feasible option.
V.3 Completing the system of protection
The level of protection for European farmers varies from commo-
dity to commodity. The simulation results for the option contin-
uation of old policies suggest that the regional imbalance of the
CAP would be redressed by an extension of high tariffs and export
subsidies to commodities of group ^5. Since the EC is a net im-
porter with respect to this group, the extension would also en-
hance CAP revenues, thus allowing for higher intervention levels
overall.
In experiment 3 a 20 % ad valorem import tariff and export sub-
sidy is imposed on extra-EC trade of group 5 commodities. The
additional revenue thereby obtained is spent on a proportional
increase in all interventions in the same way as in experiment 2.
The VAT contribution is fixed at 1.0 %. The simulation results in
Table 2 suggest that relative income trends would turn around in
both Italy and France. West German farmers would also gain con-
siderably against the reference case, although they would require- 29 -
additional assistance were relative income to be maintained at
the base-year level. As was observed earlier, the EC cannot raise
import tariffs on important products within the aggregate without
violating a commitment within the GATT. The simulation results
illustrate why these tariffs remain attractive to agricultural
policymakers and why the EC-Commission continues to attempt to
annul its commitment through negotiations.
V.4 Relying on producer levies
As observed earlier, one ECU spent on export subsidies raises
farmers' relative income by more than one ECU spent on producer
subsidies. Sector politicians can exploit the difference by
shifting funds from producer to export subsidies, thus forcing
domestic consumers to support farmers' income. Instead of asking
the European taxpayers for a higer VAT\ contribution, the Council
of Agricultural Ministers might consider to enlarge funds for
export subsidies through negative producer subsidies, that is,
producer levies. The instrument is already used to finance the
disposal of sugar on the world market. Under the name of "cor-
responsibility levy" it has also been introduced in the milk
market, though on a much smaller scale . The Council might con-
template to extend the instrument to all commodities the Com-
munity exports.
As a percentage of final production, in 1982 the sugar producer
levy amounted to 19.9% and the milk producer corresponsibility
levy to 1.9%. Commission of the European Communities 1983.- 30 -
In experiment 4 income policy is financed through a producer levy
on meat, dairy products and cereals. The sugar levy is held con-
stant along with all other interventions with respect to sugar
and other food (group 5 commodities). Technically, the model
provides for a proportional reduction in the ad valorem rates of
group 1, 2 and 4 producer subsidies net of producer levies and
channels funds thereby released into a proportional increase of
ad valorem export subsidy rates. Import tariff rates are raised
proportionally. The West German relative income target is then
imposed and the model solves for the producer levy. The solution
indicates that a 3.8 % producer levy or the corresponding cut in
subsidies would be sufficient . The results further suggest that
French farmers would likewise be saved any loss in relative in-
come. In Italy, on the contrary, the relative income would slip
further compared to the reference case.
Experiment 4 thus indicates that the Council can indeed substi-
tute producer levies for higher VAT contributions, thus switching
the burden of income policy from the taxpayer to the consumer.
Comparing results with experiment 2 (higher intervention levels
financed through additional VAT contributions), however, reveals
that a reliance on producer levies would even further aggravate
the regional imbalance of the CAP. Thus, unless the EC-Commission
can undo the GATT commitment, a renewal of the pre-1984 strategy
seems unlikely, both with additional VAT contributions and with
producer levies.
The levy is calculated on the final output of both primary and
processing activity. If raised on primary output only, it would
have to be accordingly higher.- 31 -
V.5 Extending production quotas
With the 1984 decision on production quotas and guarantee thres-
holds the Council has opened the option of an active price policy
within a given budget limit. Were the Council to rely on that
option in years to come, the ministers would have to impose quo-
tas on all commodities in which the Community has reached, or is
about to reach, self-sufficiency. Sector-specific resources would
otherwise be switched from, say, milk production to cereals pro-
duction. Since domestic consumers respond to higher prices the
quotas would have to be fixed below actual production levels.
A pure quota solution to the relative income problem of sector
policy has certain adverse implications. Substantial price in-
creases are required which noticeably boost the consumer price
index. With smaller output and continued growth of total factor
productivity more labour is squeezed out of the sector. Rental
incomes accrue to quota owners. Only by linking the ownership
rights of quotas and land, however, can the new instrument be
made to serve the relative income target. Small farmers giving up
production then receive little compensation in the form of quota
rents which means that intra-sector conflicts of interest are
intensified. Whether or not these implications elicit protest
which renders the quota solution infeasible depends, i.a., on the
magnitude of price and employment effects. The model is used to
simulate the implications of a policy which attempts, within the
given budget limits, to maintain relative income by raising
prices and restricting production.- 32 -
In experiment 5 quotas are extended from sugar to meat, dairy
products and cereals. Prices are allowed to increase, though the
price ratios and the quantity ratios between commodities produced
under the quota system are held constant. The budget stays within
the limit set by the 1% VAT contribution. Once a relative income
target is imposed for any particular region, the model solves for
the price increase and the quota reduction necessary to achieve
that target. Three computations were made fixing, respectively,
the relative rental income in West Germany, France and Italy. The
results indicate that all quotas would have to be reduced by,
respectively, 32%, 30% and 15%, which would allow for price in-
creases of, respectively, 79%, 76% and 41%. The results for the
case of constant relative income in West Germany are reported in
Table 2. They indicate that agricultural employment would decline
sharply in all countries (33% in Italy and more than 40% in West
Germany and France) . The magnitude of both the price and the
employment effect suggests that a pure quota solution to the
relative income problem of farmers are well-endowed with land
would meet with strong resistance outside and inside the sector.
V.6 Raising prices and quotas within an expanded budget
The simulation results so far have suggested that neither a pure
production quota strategy nor a continuation of the pre-1984
price and subsidy policy, whether financed by higher VAT contri-
butions or by producer levies, would be feasible. As these in-- 33 -
struments have adverse implications for agricultural employment
and for the regional distribution of CAP benefits, their use
would, respectively, elicit the protest of small farmers and of
national sector politicians. The 1984 decisions, however, leave
room for a less restrictive quota policy - prices can be raised
on constant or even increasing quotas, and the budget can be
balanced by higher VAT contributions or by producer levies. The
policy choice is then one between different combinations of price
increases and quota expansions within an expanded budget. An
active quota policy allows for smaller price increases and a less
ruthless squeeze of agricultural employment. Quota expansions
which differ by country, furthermore, provide room for the re-
conciliation of divergent national sector interests. An active
price policy, on the other hand, by requiring smaller quota ex-
pansions has less adverse consequences with respect to foreign
policy conflicts about agricultural trade.
There is, of course, a wide range of perceivable combinations
between an active price policy and an active quota policy. The
range can be narrowed down by admitting only non-negative quota
changes and non-negative price changes. The two polar cases are
simulated next.
In experiment 6a, quotas are held constant at the 1982 production
levels of meat, dairy products, sugar and cereals. Prices are
allowed. to increase, yet price ratios between commodities pro-
duced under quota regulations are fixed. The relative income
target is imposed for a particular country, and the model then- 34 -
solves for the price increase on all quota products that is ne-
cessary to achieve the target. French and West German farmers
enjoy a rising relative income when prices are increased so as to
maintain the income position of Italian farmers. The simulation
results for this case are reported in Table 2. The other polar
case is simulated in experiment 6b where prices of commodities
produced under quotas are held constant. Quotas are allowed to
increase, with rates that vary from region to region. The rela-
tive income target is now imposed for each region, and the model
solves for the region-specific quota adjustments necessary to
achieve these targets. In both experiments the higher CAP deficit
is financed through VAT contributions. MCAs, producer subsidies
net of producer levies, and all intervention levels for group 5
commodities are held constant.
The results reported in Table 2 indicate that both an active
price and an active quota policy would raise the CAP deficit by
amounts which are within the limit set by the European Council's
decision on a 1.6 % VAT contribution. In the case of fixed
quantities prices would have to be
rraised by about 42 %, whereas,
when prices are held constant, quotas need to be increased by 27
% in West Germany, 34 % in France, 79 % in Italy and 26 % in the
Rest-EC. Agricultural employment would then fall 18-20 %, more
than in the reference case, yet decidedly less than in the case
of a pure quota solution. An active quota policy structured to
meet national relative income target levels, in contrast, would
attract labour into the agricultural sector, in the extreme Ital-
ian case sector employment would grow by more than 25 %. ^- 35 -
From a sector politician's point of view both polar cases may
have disadvantages. Solidarity between small and large farmers
could be overextended when labour demand falls by the amount
indicated in experiment 6a and ownership rights to quotas and
land are linked. German and French agricultural ministers, on the
other hand, may find it difficult to explain to their clientele
the size of the difference in quota expansions suggested in expe-
riment 6b, albeit a disproportional quota expansion will more
easily find approval than a disproportional quota reduction.
While the polar cases may not appeal to sector politicians, a
wide range of combinations between them does. Note that the im-
plications of any combination of price and quota increases, due
to the linear structure of the model, can be obtained as weighted
averages of the results for the two polar cases.
VI. Wider implications of European agricultural policy choice
Combining price and quota policies, European agricultural policy-
makers can maintain national relative incomes within the extended
budget limit indicated by the Prime Ministers and Heads of State.
General policy constraints other than the budget limit, however,
have been neglected in the process of searching for options ac-
ceptable to the political sector elite. It was observed in sec-
tion II that adverse implications for domestic consumer prices,
for the net transfers between a country and its partners in the
Community, and for the EC's external trade relations, particular-
ly with the United States of America, can motivate national poli-Table 5 - Medium-run model projection of the consumer price index and the net budget and trade transfer in West Germany,
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7.15 10.54 10.77 6.98
5.59 3.98^ 10.65 4.68
Net budget and trade transfer
(changes in Bill.ECU of 1982)
G F I R
-0.90 0.55 -3.92 4.27
-2.85 0.15 -2.31 4.71
Table 6 - Implications of price and quota policies for extra-EC agricultural trade
Bill. ECU of 1982
Trade variable
EC net exports (extra-EC)
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ticians to bear upon the agricultural policy choice. The respec-
tive model results for the two polar cases are interpreted next.
VI.1 Domestic consumer prices
The share of food in the consumption expenditure of private
households varies between 15% in West Germany and 26% in Italy.
An active price policy which raises the prices of meat, dairy
products and cereals by more than 40% (see Table 2, experiment
6a) thus has a substantial direct effect on the consumer price
index. The simulation results in Table 5 indicate that also an
active quota policy with constant prices has inflationary impli-
cations. These are due to general equilibrium effects: the active
quota policy attracts resources into the agricultural sector
thereby pushing up primary factor costs in industry; additional
agricultural production activates the agricultural trade balance
and, through balance of payments equilibrium, allows for fewer
/
industrial exports; domestic industrial suppliers can, therefore,
raise product prices so as to accommodate the factor cost push.
The figures in Table 5 show that the push would be particularly
strong in Italy, which reflects the exceptional agricultural
employment effects of an active quota policy in that country (see
Table 2, experiment 6b).
The inflationary effects of an active price and an active quota
policy are hardly to be distinguished in Italy. The difference
amounts to less than 2% in West Germany, yet to nearly 7% in
France. The striking difference between France and her partners- 37 -
reflects the higher share of food in the French (compared to the
German) consumer price index, and the smaller increase in produc-
tion quotas required to maintain the French (compared to the
Italian) relative income of farmers. Economic planners in France
may, therefore, be inclined to influence the agricultural policy
choice towards the raising of quotas rather than prices.
VI.2 Transfer between member countries
All governments have agreed to a higher VAT contribution from
1986 onwards. Since both options stay within the new budget
limit, differences with respect to the aggregate budget implica-
tion are not likely to be of much relevance in the choice between
combinations of price and quota expansions. Common financing and
preferential trade within the Community, however, cause trans-
fers the country-specific net position of which is a prominent
topic in the public debate about the CAP. As such it conceivably
colours the view of general politicians.
A narrow concept of transfers relates to the financial flows
between each country and the Community exchequer - export re-
funds on extra-EC exports, intervention payments and net MCAs
on the one side; sugar producer levies, levies on extra-EC
agricultural imports, tariffs on extra-EC industrial imports,
and the direct VAT contribution and other contributions on the
other side -. The wider concept used here also includes the
transfers between intra-EC exporting and importing regions
caused by common prices above world market level. Since the
model treats agricultural commodities produced in member states
as perfect substitutes, it cannot separate the financial trans-
fers from the net budget and trade effect.- 38 -
The figures in Table 5 indicate that previous trends continue in
both cases - losses concentrate in West Germany and Italy, large
net gains accrue to the Rest-EC whereas the budget and trade
effects nearly balance in France . The choice between the two
polar cases determines, however, the burden sharing between West
Germany and Italy. West German politicians clearly have a motive
to opt for higher prices on constant quotas, Italian politicians
for larger quotas at constant prices, whereas French politicians
could be indifferent in this respect.
VI.3 Agricultural trade conflict
European governments have been faced with the prospect of a trade
war should the Community's agricultural exports to the rest of
the world capture more than an unspecified "fair share". A common
agricultural income policy, if set on a parity target for those
presently employed in the sector need not risk a foreign policy
conflict as it can allow the gap between domestic and world
market prices to narrow. For a policy attempting to maintain the
relative income position of landowners, however, direct income
transfers are not a feasible option. A pure price and subsidy
policy without a budget limit, by fostering production and re-
tarding consumption within the Community, inevitably heads for a
Buckwell et al. (1982) have estimated the net budget and trans-
fer effects of the existence of the CAP in the EC-9 1980 com-
pared to a free trade situation. Their figures are: West Germa-
ny -1.74, France -0.04, Italy -0.93 and Rest-EC 2.71 (all in
Bill. ECU of 1980) . Within the Rest-EC, the losses falling on
the United Kingdom (-1.92) are swamped by the sizable gains
accruing to the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland.- 39 -
conflict with external trade partners. A pure quota solution
would tend to eliminate net exports of meat, dairy products,
sugar and cereals. The model calculations in section V.5, how-
ever, strongly suggest that such a policy is unlikely to be
adopted for reasons within the agricultural sector. What seems
acceptable to European agricultural policy makers are combina-
tions of price and quota policies which do not enforce production
or price cuts below the 1982 level.
Table 6 reports the net exports of neat, dairy products, cereals
and other food from the EC to the rest of the world 19 82 and
gives the model projections for the two polar cases after five
years. Although production volumes for meat, dairy products and
cereals are fixed under the active price policy, domestic con-
sumers
1 response to higher prices can activate net exports. The
figures in Table 6 suggest substantial expansions of meat and
dairy exports which are due to high (absolute) own-price elasti-
cities of domestic household consumption. The stagnant net export
position of cereals reflects stagnant domestic demand for both
consumption and intermediate use in current production which is
related, respectively, to own-price elasticities of consumption
near zero and to constant animal production. Consumption of other
food commodities picks up as households respond to lower relative
prices, and net imports in group 5 consequently increase. Yet, in
total, the EC turns from a net importer to a net exporter already
in the case of constant quotas. With respect to an active quota
policy, of course, the model projects a much more dramatic net
export growth.- 40 -
The figures for the active quota policy are neither consistent
with the world export figures of 1982, nor with a simple extrapo-
lation based on the assumption of an annual growth of 5% over the
five-year period. The same may be said about the net exports of
dairy products simulated for the active price policy case. These
inconsistencies result from two independent projections that need
to be interpreted with respect to their underlying assumptions.
One implication of agricultural protection in OECD countries is
the small size oi the world market compared to total EC produc-
tion. Small changes in the EC's commodity balance, therefore,
have a strong impact on the EC's world market share, whereas a
large improvement in the net export position is only possible
when aggressive EC export policies by themselves enlarge the
world market, for example through concessional arrangements nego-
tiated with countries outside the OECD. This assumption was made
when the EC model was specified with world export demand elasti-
cities that reflect past experience with small changes. It might
be argued, however, that governments in the rest of the world are
more likely to step up import protection for domestic farmers
than to allow domestic consumers to accept the gift of European
agricultural policy. Even a 5% annual growth of world exports
would then look too optimistic.
The comparison of simulated net exports of the EC with extra-
polated world exports suggests that the European sector politi-
cians will meet with stiff foreign policy resistance for any
policy which is not in the neighbourhood of the active price and
constant quota policy polar case. This might signal a conflict of- 41 -
interests between the governments of member countries interested
in an active quota policy (France,Italy) and of member countries
concerned about foreign retaliations against their non-agricul-
tural exports, for example West Germany. Even the polar case of
an active price policy, however, is shown to entail an increasing
interference in the world markets for meat and dairy products.
This suggests that a conflict with US agricultural trade policy
might be inavoidable, unless European agricultural policymakers
are persuaded to compromise on their income target. Increasing
net imports of other food, on the other hand, that are simulated
for the same case, provide a hint that Community negotiators
might continue in their efforts to seek the consent of the US
government for a higher protection for commodities in group 5,
and might offer some restraint with respect to production quotas
for other commodities. As was observed in section V.3, such a
policy would be consistent with the relative income target and
would serve to redress the regional imbalance of the CAP.
VII. Conclusions
Writing on farm policies in the U.S., the EC and in other OECD
countries a dozen years ago, Johnson (1973) remarked that the
cost of export subsidies is the only measure of the absorptive
capacity of world market that seems significant to policymakers
in the industrial countries. These costs have indeed persuaded
the European Council of Agricultural Ministers to introduce pro-
duction quotas for a major group of commodities. The aim of this- 42 -
paper was to investigate whether their move signals a reversal in
the trend of European trade interference. It was felt necessary,
firstly, to analyse positively which policies can or cannot find
approval in the European political process and, secondly, to
narrow down the range of instruments and instrument levels by
working out quantitatively the implications for the sector policy
targets and the general policy constraints.
The main point made in the positive analysis is that in the view
of agricultural policymakers in West Germany, France and other
member states the income parity of those presently engaged in the
sector would not redress farmers' dissatisfaction with market
coordination. Dissatisfaction relates to the prospect of a de-
teriorating relative income position brought about by a decline
in returns to factors that are specific to the sector in the
long-run. Direct income transfers that serve the parity target
are, therefore, not acceptable. Since the political sector elite
consisting of specialized parliamentarians, high-level admini-
strators and functionaries of farmers' associations has managed
to insulate their policy domain, no sector policy proposal can
find approval in the political process without their consent.
A comparative-static EC model with four regions reflecting West
Germany, France, Italy and the Rest-EC 10 was used to work out
quantitatively the implications of the remaining policy options.
Model simulations then indicated that within, the budget con-
straint, the regional income targets cannot be achieved jointly
without introducing either quotas or extending the high level of
common import protection to all commodities. The latter would- 43 -
violate commitments within the GATT. Yet also a pure quota so-
lution within the existing budget turned out to be infeasible
since a contracting domestic demand would have to be reflected in
implausible quota reductions which, furthermore, would have to
discriminate between regions. Yet the budget was shown not to be
a limiting factor. This allows sector politicians to combine
price increases and quota expansions. Further simulations then
suggested that the Council of Agricultural Ministers can maintain
relative income of farmers in all regions with a combined policy.
The polar cases of an active price policy with constant quotas
and an active quota policy with fixed prices were subsequently
explored for their effects on the regional consumer price indi-
ces, the net budget and trade transfers, and on net extra-EC com-
modity exports. The results indicate that French and Italian
politicians would be motivated to object to the polar case of an
active price policy with constant quotas. The world market impli-
cations of quota extensions, however, are such that serious for-
eign policy retaliations would be unavoidable. Member governments
concerned about their country's non-agricultural exports can be
expected to narrow the choice of policies to the neighbourhood of
/an active price policy. Even that, however, entails a further
rapid expansion of net exports form the EC to the rest of the
world. The commodity-specific simulation results, furthermore,
indicate an interest on the side of European sector politicians
to negotiate about the level of production for various commodi-
ties which are bound by GATT regulations, and to offer some re-
straint with respect to commodities in which the Community holds- 44 -
a positive net export position. A combination of expanded quotas
and higher prices in the neighbourhood of an active price policy
is then the most likely prediction about the future Common Agri-
cultural Policy. This entails a further rapid expansion of meat
and dairy product net exports from the EC to the rest of the
world.
Finally, two observations can be made. (1) Within the institu-
tional setting of agricultural policymaking in Europe, the expan-
sion of quota regulations from sugar and milk to cereals and,
possibly, to meat production seems to be unavoidable, unless
direct income transfers find approval. Prevailing notions of
social justice, however, seem to allow only for modest transfers
allowing farmers' households an income comparable to that of
dependent workers' households. Such transfers cannot compensate
for declining returns to land and durable physical capital, and
thus are not acceptable to those shaping sector policy. In fu-
ture, though, the sector policy elite might attempt to expand the
concept of social justice to include direct compensations for
proclaimed merits of landowners in the provision of environmental
projection and other public goods. (2) The adoption of production
quotas does not signal a reversal of the increasing trend of
European trade interference. The budget problem which was press-
ing at the time of the introduction of milk production quotas is
not a lasting constraint on export growth, whereas the prospect
of a conflict with other OECD governments, determined to protect
domestic farmers regardless of welfare costs, seems to emerge as
an important issue shaping European agricultural policy.- 45 -
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Appendix: A short description of the EC model
A quantitative general equilibrium model of the EC was used to
simulate the implications of CAP options for various indicators.
The model consists of four general equilibrium models of three
member countries and the Rest of the EC-10 which are linked
through the CAP and through international trade. The disaggre-
gation of regional models with respect to commodities, sectors
and production factors has been described in section III along
with other salient features. The Appendix provides a brief des-
cription of the equation system, of the numerical specification
and of the use of the model for various policy simulations.
Al The equation system
The EC model consists of four regional models and a CAP compo-
nent. The regional models follow closely the ORANI model system
developed by Dixon et al. (1982) . To allow for a brief presen-
tation, the functional forms have been omitted in Table Al. The
role played by various substitution parameters, however, is sub-
sequently discussed.
ORANI models are barter models in which exchange rates are
nothing but conversion factors between the domestic and the for-
eign expression of the world prices of goods. In the EC model,
units have been chosen so that exchange rates are always unity.
This facilitates their omission from the equations and the list
of variables in, respectively, Tables Al and A2.- 49a -
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Table A2 - Variables of the core-model
Variable Description Number
EC-wide supplies of EC agricultural commodities h
Domestic supplies of EC agricultural commodities nh
Extra-EC exports of agricultural commodities h
EC-wide demands for EC agricultural commodities h
Domestic demands for EC agricultural and domestic industrial commodities nh+n
Vector parts
Exports of industrial commodities n
EC-wide demands for extra-EC agricultural commodities h
EC-wide supplies of extra-EC agricultural commodities h





























































Demands for primary factors
Factor employment levels
Foreign currency prices for extra-EC agricultural exports
Foreign currency prices for extra-EC agricultural imports
ECU prices for extra-EC agricultural exports
ECU prices for extra-EC agricultural imports
Local producer prices for agricultural commodities
Local prices of EC agricultural and domestic industrial commodities
Vector parts
Local prices of extra-EC agricultural and foreign industrial commodities
Vector parts
Foreign currency prices for industrial exports
Foreign currency prices for industrial imports
Prices for primary factor services













V One plus ad valorem rate of extra-EC agricultural export subsidy h
V One plus ad valorem rate of intra-EC agricultural export subsidy or import n
a
n tariff
V One plus ad valorem rate of industrial export subsidy n
T One plus ad valorem rate of extra-EC import levy h
a




S One plus ad valorem rate of subsidies for primary factor use in agricultural n
production
W One plus ad valorem rate of EC agricultural producer subsidy net of h
producer levy
F Sector total factor productivity levels n2
C Aggregate real domestic absorptions n
CAP CAP budget deficit 1
F CAP induced budget and trade transfers n
an
B Balances on trade and CAP contributions n
n
w
V World income 1
Total: 12h + 2 + n(7h + 3m + 18)- 50 -
The CAP component
The CAP component is represented by equations (Al)-(A13). The
first three equations add up regional quantities to their respec-
tive EC totals: supplies (Al) and EC demands (A2) for agricul-
tural commodities of EC origin, and EC demands for agricultural
commodities from the rest of the world (A3). Extra-EC supplies of
these commodities to the EC (A4) contain as argument the respec-
tive world price. The specification of the supply equations re-
cognizes that the EC holds a monopsony position on world agri-
cultural comnmodity markets. Equation (A5) equates EC demand and
EC supply for extra-EC commodities.
Export demands for EC commodities, (A6), contain as arguments the
respective world price and world income. The EC is considered a
large country also on the supply side of world commodity markets.
Furthermore, provision is made for world income to influence the
export demand for EC commodities. Supplies and demands for EC
commodities are equated in equation (A7).
Equations (A8)-(A12) depict the CAP system of price support. The
model assumes that no pure profits are made, and no real resour-
ces are used, in trade activities. The revenue obtained from a
trade activity (the selling price) is then equated to the cost of
doing so (the domestic price for exporters and the domestic equi-
valent of the world price including the tariff for importers).
Fixing common prices for EC and for extra-EC commodities, the- 51 -
authorities must adjust export subsidies (A8) and import tariffs
(A9) to compensate for any difference with world prices. MCAs
drive a wedge between regional and common prices of EC commodi-
ties (A10), yet not of extra-EC commodities (All). Zero pure
profits and no use of real resources are also assumed with re-
spect to intervention buying (A12). Subsidies on the level of
intervention buying are, therefore, reflected in the difference
between regional producer and consumer prices.
Equation (A13) completes the CAP component by defining the CAP
budget deficit: expenditures on extra-EC export subsidies,
intra-EC trade subsidies and subsidies for intervention buying,
revenues from extra-EC import levies and intra-EC trade taxes, as
well as revenues from the common external tariff on industrial
imports from the rest of the world. Since the model does not
distinguish between intra-EC and extra-EC industrial trade, dif-
ferences in the intra-EC/extra-EC composition of each region's
industrial imports are captured by different tariff rates.
Regional models
The regional model equations can be divided into six groups;
Demands. The models use the Armington approach to the treatment
of external sector transactions. All sources of domestic demands
(households, government, current production, capital creation)
are demands for composite goods defined as CES aggregates of
domestically produced and imported goods. The optimal composition- 52 -
of each composite good follows from minimizing the cost of
acquiring the good subject to the condition that a given level of
demand is satisfied. In the ORANI model system this is captured
through nested production and utility functions. Sector demand
equations for domestic and imported commodities and for primary
factors are derived from the assumption that producers choose
their commodity and factor inputs to minimize their output costs
subject to constant returns to scale production functions of an
hierarchical or nested form. At the first level is the Leontief
assumption of no substitution between categories of intermediate
inputs or between them and aggregates of primary factors. At the
second level are CES functions describing substitution between
imported and domestic sources of each intermediate input cate-
gory. At the third level of the agricultural production function
is the Leontief assumption of no substitution between the aggre-
gates of primary factors used in primary production and in food
processing. At the fourth level of the agricultural production
function, and at the third level of the industrial production
function are CES functions describing substitution possibilities
between the primary factors (labour, fixed capital and land).
Household demand equations for domestic and imported commodities
are derived assuming that consumers maximize an additive nested
utility function subject to an aggregate budget constraint. Only
one household class is recognized. The nests of commodity cate-
gories contain CES functions describing substitution prospects in
consumption between domestic and imported sources of each con-
sumer good.- 53 -
The resultant demand equations are represented by equations
(Bl)-(B3). Equation (Bl) and (B2) depict an aggregation over the
four sources of domestic demands recognized (current production,
capital creation, household and government demands). They con-
tain, as arguments, vectors of local commodity prices (domestic
and imported industrial commodities and, respectively, EC and
extra-EC agricultural commodities) and of activity variables
(represented by Z and C) . Z, the vector of sector output levels,
appears in the model equations explaining demands for interme-
diate inputs. C is the level of real domestic absorption, i.e.,
public and private consumption and investment. The inclusion of a
single scalar variable to reflect the levels of final demands by
domestic users considerably simplifies the model treatment. The
model equations allow demands to respond to the distribution of
aggregate absorption across households, the government and capi-
tal formation. Equations (Bl) and (B2) contain a set of elasti-
cities describing the extent of substitution between domestic and
imported sources of supply in each of the end uses. Equations
referring to household demands, additionally, contain household
expenditure and price elasticity parameters.
Sector production functions allow for substitution between types
of primary factors, but not between them and other input cate-
gories. The resulting factor demands, depicted in (B3) , are thus
not determined by intermediate input prices, but by levels of
output, by factor prices and subsidies, and by levels of total
factor productivity. Because regional agricultural commodities
are perfect substitutes, export demands are described in the CAP- 54 -
component. Industrial export demands, (B4), contain as arguments
foreign export prices and world income (as explained before, the
conversion factor between the domestic currency and the foreign
currency expression of world prices is always unity). The in-
dustrial sector faces a downward sloping export demand curve.
World income growth results in an upward shift of the industrial
export demand curve. On the import side, "small country" assump-
tions prevail, that is, the world price of industrial imports is
exogenously given.
Commodity supplies. Unlike the industrial sector, the agricul-
tural sector produces more than one commodity. Underlying the
model specification of agricultural commodity supplies in equa-
tion (B5) is a "multi-output, multi-input" production function
which is separable between inputs and outputs. At a given acti-
vity level agricultural producers are assumed to choose their
commodity output composition to maximize their revenue subject to
CES output functions describing transformation prospects between
competing commodities in production . Hence (B5) contains para-
meters determining the strength of transformation between com-
modities in the output bundle for a given change in relative
prices. Alternatively, when production quotas apply, they deter-
mine changes in the quota rent.
Market Clearing. The markets for agricultural commodities clear
on the EC level (A7), those for industrial goods on the regional
The choice of restrictive CES functions was made necessary by
the paucity of data. See section A2 on the numerical specifi-
cation of the model.- 55 -
level (B6). Equation (B7) indicates that factor employment de-
mands are satisfied. Full employment assumptions are not imposed.
Zero Pure Profits. Equations (B8)-(B11) describe the zero pure
profit conditions for each of the activities recognized on the
regional level - agricultural and industrial production and in-
dustrial exporting and importing. In (B8) and (B9) production
revenue per unit of activity in each country (a function of do-
mestic prices df the commodities produced by that sector) equals
costs per unit of activity (prices of domestic and imported in-
puts, factor service prices, subsidies and taxes). Equation (BIO)
equates the revenue from exporting (right hand side) to the cost
of doing so (the domestic price), (Bll) equates the selling
prices of imported commodities to the cost of importing which
represents the domestic currency expression of the foreign price
including the tariff.
A general equilibrium model must satisfy Walras' law. Most
authors explicitly include equations in which household consump-
tion is constrained by household income. They show that balance
of payments equilibrium is then implied . The ORANI model system
explicitly includes the balance of payments equilibrium con-
dition, and recognizes only one household. The income-expenditure
link for households is then implicit. Equation (B12) imposes the
i
condition that the consolidated balance of trade and of CAP con-
tributions must be in equilibrium. Any change in a region's agri-
cultural trade balance and in CAP contributions, therefore, re-
See, for example, Gunning, Carrin and Waelbroeck (1982).- 56 -
quires an adjustment on the side of that region's industrial
imports or exports. Since the world prices of industrial imports
are given and the exchange rate is held constant, the adjustment
is brought about by a change in the price of domestically pro-
duced industrial goods.
Included in the model are equations defining useful summary va-
riables. In Table Al, only one example is provided by equation
(B13), which defines the CAP-induced budget and trade transfers.
Further equations °are added to the core model to facilitate the
simulation of policy options. These are specified along with the
description of experiments in section A3.
A2 The numerical specification
\
The simulation mode of the model is obtained by logarithmically
differentiating the non-linear equation system represented in
Appendix Al and evaluating the derivatives at an equilibrium
point. This is a trademark of ORANI models, and the reader is
best referred to Dixon et al. (1982) for a discussion of the
derivatives and ot the solution procedure. The equilibrium point
is defined by the set of shares (such as cost shares, sales
shares and revenue shares) found in a base year in which the
economy is assumed to be in equilibrium, along with a number of
behavioural parameters (such as elasticities of substitution
between imported and exported commodities and between primary
factors, and elasticities of export and of household demand).- 57 -
1982 was chosen as the base year being both the most recent year
with a complete data set and the last year before farmers antici-
pated the introduction of production quotas for milk. All shares
were then taken from the published statistical sources of Euro-
stat, FAO, OECD, the Commission of the EC and the German Ministry
of Nutrition, Agriculture and Forestry.
For estimates of the behavioural parameters, the general approach
was to rely on existing studies about long-run estimates to the
extent feasible and to use judgmental estimates and simplifying
assumptions in other cases.
The import supply elasticities for extra-EC agricultural commo-
dities (equation A4) were calculated by multiplying rest of the
world (ROW) supply elasticities with the reciprocal of the share
of imports of ROW in total world imports (excluding intra-EC im-
ports) . The export demand elasticities for EC commodities (equa-
tion A6) were calculated by multiplying ROW demand elasticities
with the reciprocal of the share of exports by ROW in total world
exports (excluding intra-EC exports). In this way, an attempt was
made to capture, respectively, the commodity-specific monopsony
and monopoly positions of the EC. The ROW supply and demand elas-
ticities were taken from Buckwell et al. (1982): meat, cereals
and other food, 1.0 and -0.5 respectively; dairy products 0.3 and
-0.1; sugar 1.5 and -0.1. The choice of these values is intended
to reflect the degree to which the commodities are insulated from
world trading prices by extra-EC domestic policies. The elastici-
ties of ROW demand for EC-agricultural commodities with respect- 58 -
to world income (equation A6) were figured as follows: meat,
dairy products and other food, 1.0; sugar 0.5; cereals 0.2. In
choosing these values, the rising import demand in the middle-
level income countries was taken into account.
The elasticities of substitution between agricultural commodities
from the EC and the ROW and between imported and domestic in-
dustrial goods in all domestic uses (equations Bl and B2) were,
respectively, set at -3.0 and -1.2. The value for industrial
commodities is based on Lachler's econometric work with West
German data (Lachler 1985) . Similar work on agricultural commod-
ities would be fruitless because the system of variable import
levies allows for little relative price variation. Since that
system is also built into the model, the value chosen is not
relevant for model results. Region-specific elasticities of con-
sumption demand for agricultural commodities were taken from
Caspari et al. (1980). The expenditure elasticity of demand for
the industrial commodity was then calculated through the Engel
aggregation. Cross-price elasticities between the industrial and
the various agricultural commodities were assumed to zero.
Substitution elasticities among primary factors (equation B3) are
assumed to 1.0 in both sectors thus yielding a Cobb-Douglas spe-
cification of the CES production function. Casual experiments
showed no sensitivity of the results to reasonable variations in
these parameters.- 59 -
The industrial export demand elasticities with respect to world
income and the world price of exports from the region (equation
B4) were based on Kirkpatrick's estimate for aggregate German
exports and set to 1.12 and -2.0 respectively for all four re-
gions of the EC-model (Kirkpatrick 1984) .
In equation (B5) a multi-output production function is specified
for the agricultural sector which requires a set of pairwise
transformation elasticities between the various outputs. These
elasticities are precisely related to the complete set of own-
and cross-price elasticities of supply . The set cannot be esti-
mated from European time-series data because the CAP has not
allowed for sufficient variation in relative prices. The only
feasible way out was taken by the Food and Agriculture Program
team of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
2 (IIASA) . The team built a programming submodel as part of a
""general equilibrium policy model. The price policy experiments
then yielded a set of country-specific own- and cross-price elas-
ticities. These results were kindly made available to the author.
It turned out impossible to honour the homogeneity constraint
within a CRETH specification of the output function. It was then
decided to adopt a CES specification which yields a common value
for all pairwise elasticities. Judging on the basis of the IIASA
results the long-run elasticities of transformation with respect
1 See Vincent et al. (1980) .
2 See Farber et al. (1984).- 60 -
to a 1 % change in relative output prices were set to 0.2 in West
Germany and Rest-EC, 0.25 in France and 0.3 in Italy.
A3 The policy simulations
The reference case
The core model presented in section Al is used to develop the
reference case against which policy options are evaluated. The
reference case is defined by a freeze on all intervention levels
and a five-year continuation of exogenous trends. The freezing of
intervention levels is achieved by exogenously setting all chan-
ges in policy variables to zero: P - , P _, W , V , R - , V ,
al 3.A a an ain gn
rgn
p
T and S . Exogenous trends are imposed as described in section
w — IV and Table 1: Y , F , F , L . Balance of payments equilibrium an gn n
 J
is imposed by fixing B . The absolute price level is determined
by fixing P » . The number of exogenously determined variables -
3h + 1 + n(h + m + 8) - equals the difference between the number
of total variables in Table A2 and the number of equations in
Table Al.
Continuing old policies with higher VAT contributions
In experiment 2 the relative income target of one region (West
Germany) is achieved by a proportional increase in CAP expendi-
tures on export subsidies and producer subsidies of all five- 61 -
commodity groups. The core model is expanded by equations defin-
ing additional variables and imposing additional conditions.
Relative rental income for each region (R ) is defined by
(i) R = (p<
3
) L + z R .. xf,. )/ z p<q) L(q)





J and the l/
q
J are, respectively, the factor service
prices and the factor quantities of labour (q=l), capital (q=2)
and land (q=3).
CAP expenditure on commodity export subsidies (V!) and on commo-
dity producer subsidies (W!) is defined, respectively, by
(2) V! = (V . - 1) P
W, . X
En . h
v l ai all all
(3) W! = (W . - 1) P . . X
s.. . h
v ' I ai all all
where the i subscripts (i=l,...,5) denote the commodity groups.
The conditions of proportional CAP expenditure growth are repre-
sented by





where the lower case letters are the growth rates of the upper
case letters defined above. To maintain the commodity-specific
level of import protection, the domestic prices of imports from






Comparing numbers with the reference case, there are n+2h addi-
tional variables and n+5h-l additional equations. Thus, 3h-l





e transferred from the list of exoge-
nous variables. Adding the relative rental income of West German
farmers (R ) to the exogenous list, the total number of endoge-
I
nous variables again equals the number of equations.
i
i
Completing the system of protection
In experiment 3 the import tariff and the export subsidy on group
5 commodities are raised by 20%. The additional revenue is not
allowed to reduce the CAP deficit, but is spent on a proportional
increase of all export and producer subsidies (excluding the
export subsidies on group 5). Compared to experiment 2, the two
variables CAP and T move to the exogenous list, while R is
again made endogenous. Note that the export subsidy on group 5
(V ) moves up through the condition of proportional price in-
creases for EC commodities and their imported substitutes (equa-
tion 6) . Since the expenditure on group 5 export subsidies is
independently determined, the number of equations (5) is reduced
by one, thus matching the number of endogenous variables.
Relying on producer levies
In the fourth experiment higher export subsidies on meat, dairy
products and cereals are financed through producer levies, that- 63 -
is, a reduction of producer subsidies on the same commodities.
The changes in the ad valorem rates of subsidies are made to vary
proportionally which adds equations
(7) va. = val (i=2,4) 2
(8) wa. = wal <i=2,4) 2
to the model. The condition of proportional expenditure growth on
all subsidies is dropped which removes equations (4) and (5) from
the model. The ad valorem rates of export subsidies and of pro-
ducer subsidies on sugar and on other food (V,, V K , W -, W K)
dJ 3.0 cij ab
are kept constant in this experiment. Since the CAP's savings on
producer subsidies are to be spent wholly on export subsidies,
also the CAP deficit moves to the exogenous list. Compared to
experiment 2, then, the model is reduced by five equations and
five variables are transferred from the endogenous to the exo-
genous list.
Extending production quotas
A pure production quota solution is simulated with experiment 5.
The Council attempts to maintain relative rental income of far-
mers in West Germany by raising prices on meat, dairy products
and cereals proportionally, and it tries to honour the budget
limit by restricting the production levels of these commodities
proportionally. The conditions of proportional changes in commo-
dity prices and in regional production quotas are added to the
model








(11) x^ln = x^lG (n#G) n-1
The sugar price and the regional sugar production quotas are held
constant in this experiment. With respect to group 5 commodities,
the ad valorem rates of export subsidy and producer subsidy are
fixed. The ad valorem rates of producer subsidy are also fixed
for the other commodities. Along with the condition of an un-
c
changing CAP deficit, this adds n+h+3 variables (X,, , P o, W . , ? ^ ' 31n' a3' ai'
V , CAP) to the exogenous list of experiment 2. Removed from
that list are the n(h-l) variables representing the commodity-
specific quota rents in each region (R . . ; i^5) . The 2h-l
ai in
equations imposing proportional CAP expenditure changes on export
and producers subsidies are removed from the model. The number of
additions to the lists of equations and of exogenous variables
thus balances the number of removals.
Active price policy
In experiment 6a the production quotas for meat, dairy products
and cereals are fixed, and the Council, without constraints on
the CAP deficit, attempts to maintain the relative rental income
target for Italian farmers through proportional price increases
on meat, dairy products and cereals. The experiment can easily be
compared to experiment 5: 2 variables (CAP, R ) are removed from
g
the exogenous list, 2 variables (X..., ' RT) are added. Note that
production quotas are linked through equations (10) and (11).- 65 -
Active quota policy
In experiment 6b the prices of meat, dairy products and cereals
are fixed. Relative rental income is maintained in all regions by
allowing for disproportional increases of regional production
quotas. Compared to experiment 5, the n-1 equations imposing the
condition of proportional regional quota changes are dropped from
the model, and one variable (CAP) is removed from the exogenous
list. The n-1 variables representing the relative rental income
in regions other than West Germany are added to the exogenous
list, along with one price variable (P -,-,)• Note that prices are
linked through equation (9).